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FRONTIER BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
Graeme W Austin* 
This article is an edited transcript of Professor Graeme W Austin's Inaugural Lecture, delivered in 
the Council Chamber of Victoria University of Wellington on 15 November 2012. Professor Austin 
was appointed Chair in Private Law in the Faculty of Law in November 2010. This lecture explores 
claims that in copyright law, the public domain is necessarily in opposition to proprietary rights, 
and suggests that in many contexts the incentives offered by copyright contribute to the vibrancy 
and volume of material that is available for downstream creativity and innovation. Drawing on his 
earlier work on the relationship between human rights law and intellectual property, Professor 
Austin's lecture advances the idea that cognisance of the human rights dimensions of intellectual 
property, including creators' human rights, should inform our understanding of the appropriate 
scope of the rights of copyright owners. The lecture concludes with a warning against the 
"Walmartization" of copyright. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The metaphors in the title of this talk – "property on the line" and "life on the frontier" – try to 
capture something about the craft of lawyering, and perhaps something especially salient about the 
work of academic lawyers. As lawyers, we are very often on the frontier. Whatever the subject area, 
lawyers occupy an uneasy space where claims and concepts are constantly contested – and where 
different normative visions, different ideas about what ought to be, vie for attention.    
Legal regimes of course benefit from certainty and predictability.1 But disputes over the 
"oughts" in the legal order reflect at least two important truths about the human condition: first, that 
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1  See for example RH Coase "The Problem of Social Cost" in RH Coase The Firm, The Market, and The Law 
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we are disputatious; and, second, that we are constantly striving to improve things. In the legal 
discipline, we're all frontiersmen and women: peering beyond the boundary of (relative) legal 
certainty into a much more contested territory. And sometimes, especially so in pluralistic societies, 
part of the challenge is that others might have got there first. This makes it harder to take tried-and-
true ideas for granted. But if our minds and hearts are open, we can learn from the ways that others 
see things. 
The specific boundary on which I shall focus this evening is that between property – or, more 
specifically, copyright (a particular, even peculiar, type of property) – and the public domain. In 
broad terms, copyright law concerns whether, and to what extent, creative expression can and 
should be privatised (that is, be made the subject of property rights). The public domain is said to be 
across the border, as it were, from this kind of property. The public domain is thus that area that 
belongs to no one and to everyone, from which we all can draw in our own creative efforts.2 Ideas 
about the public domain can be highly relevant to technology entrepreneurs' views about their 
freedom to operate – whether, for example, firms marketing distribution platforms need to factor 
copyright licences into their operating costs, or whether they are entitled to use others' creative 
outputs as seed capital.3   
The boundary between copyright law and the public domain provokes vigorous debate. There is 
a lot at stake here. Privatise too far upstream, lock up too much of the materials of culture, and 
downstream we'll be left with desert – nothing with which our creative juices can mix. For the 
intellectual property rich – both firms and nations – there is also much to provoke anxiety. 
Copyright owners are already labouring under technological assaults of various kinds.4 Over the 
border from copyright, in the public domain, there might not be dragons, but there are certainly 
uncompensated uses. Moving the line further toward the public domain would add legal insult to 
technological injury. Alternatively, some see copyright and the public domain as being locked in 
  
Glazebrook J: "Reliability and certainty are primary considerations of any system of property rights, and the 
unprovoked alteration of those rights is to be avoided where possible". 
2  Professors David Lange and Jessica Litman authored two of the seminal articles on the public domain. 
David Lange "Recognizing the Public Domain" (1981) 44 Law & Contemp Probs 147; Jessica Litman "The 
Public Domain" (1990) 39 Emory L J 965.    
3  This point was discussed, for example, during oral argument in the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Grokster v MGM 545 US 913 (2005) (Transcript 04-480, 29 March 2005 at 36 per Justice Kennedy): 
… what you want to do is to say that unlawfully expropriated property can be used by the 
owner of the instrumentality as part of the startup capital for his product. … [J]ust from an 
economic standpoint and a legal standpoint, that sounds wrong to me.  
4  For an insightful survey of technological challenges to copyright, and technological and legal responses by 
copyright owners, see Jessica Litman Digital Copyright: protecting intellectual property on the Internet 
(Prometheus Books, New York, 2001) at 151–165. 
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battle. Copyright means to vanquish the public domain – but the "free culture movement" might turn 
out to be copyright's Achilles' heel.5 
How can we improve the way that we talk about the boundary between copyright and the public 
domain? Or to prod the metaphor once more, how can we live better on this frontier? First, I shall 
frame this discussion by considering some of the justifications for copyright. Second, I'll explore 
some of the legal principles that are relevant to our understanding of the copyright/public domain 
divide. Toward the end, I'll suggest that how we think about the copyright/public domain divide says 
something about the kind of society to which we aspire, perhaps even about who we want to be. 
II COPYRIGHT JUSTIFICATIONS 
It is quite obvious that justifications for copyright are under siege. Figuratively and 
commercially the "buy in" is increasingly absent. Difficulties with copyright are nothing new, 
however. The case for copyright has long been characterised as "uneasy".6 Viewed through a 
utilitarian lens, justifications for intellectual property seem thinner than for other kinds of property.7   
Justifications for the general institution of private property are ambitious indeed, explaining 
nothing less than society itself. The very reason people entered society, it is claimed, was to secure 
their property rights.8 Within the utilitarian skein, property has two intertwined justifications: first, 
property rights prevent overgrazing – the wasteful overuse of resources, sometimes described as the 
tragedy of the commons;9 second, and relatedly, property facilitates the internalisation of the 
investment in creating and maintaining resources.10 There is also a natural rights flavour to all of 
this: Locke sought to persuade us11 that the institution of private property was justified by mixing 
  
5  For a graphical representation of this metaphor, see Christopher Dombres "The Battle of Copyright" (2011) 
<www.christopherdombres.fr>, where the artist depicts copyright as Achilles, vanquishing Hektor (the 
public domain), but with an arrow in copyright's heel representing "free culture".  
6  Stephen Breyer "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs" (1970) 84 Harv L Rev 281. 
7  For an exploration of these ideas, see Carol M Rose "Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of 
Public Property in the Information Age" (2003) 66 Law & Contemp Probs 89. 
8  John Locke (Peter Laslett (ed)) Two Treatises on Government (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1988) Second Treatise at 286; William Blackstone (Robert Malcolm Kerr (ed)) Commentaries on the Laws 
of England in Four Books (John Murray, London, 1862) vol I at 121. In Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 How 
St Tr 1030, 95 ER 807 (KB) at 818, Lord Camden drew on Locke's justification for property in the 
following passage: "The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." 
9  Garrett Hardin "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
10  One of the classic statements on this point is Harold Demsetz "Toward a Theory of Property Rights" (1967) 
57 Am Econ Rev 347. 
11  See Jeremy Waldron Law and Disagreement (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999), where it is suggested that 
Locke's recourse to the language of natural rights was a rhetorical or persuasive device. 
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our labour (that which is peculiarly our own) with the commons. The leading example he gave was 
the labour expended in gathering apples.12 He also mentioned acorns and ambergris, to some 
alliterative effect, but we tend to remember the apples. As the utilitarian take on this story goes, our 
motivation to hang on to those apples (without having to rely only on force) and to find functioning 
markets in which to sell them, encouraged us to join together to form societies under the rule of law. 
For intellectual property, however, utilitarian claims can really be grounded only in the second 
set of justifications.13 The first concern, with inefficient overuse, doesn't work. Copyright protects 
cultural productions that are non-rivalrous.14 My enjoyment of a digital file containing a movie can 
occur simultaneously with that of myriads of others. The resource survives undiminished. Hence, 
the utilitarians are left only with the economic incentives copyright provides to create and 
disseminate. So, the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne 1710, was an "Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning",15 a phrase echoed in the United States Constitution's invitation to the 
legislative branch to "promote the Progress of Science … by securing for limited Times to Authors 
… the exclusive Rights to their … Writings."16 Neither was directed at the overgrazing problem. 
If that's all there is, then our justifications for copyright need, at the very least, to account for the 
rise of amateur content. A wonderful new book on amateur media,17 co-edited by distinguished 
alumna Professor Megan Richardson, discusses in impressive detail the large and vibrant array of 
amateur content that is produced today: YouTube videos, flash mobs, blogging, pastiche audio-
visual works – some of which are known as "mash ups" – even Minecraft. The ready availability of 
the means of creation, reproduction and dissemination of cultural products, seemingly independently 
of copyright's traditional incentives, increases the pressure on copyright law to improve its cover 
story. 
Secondly, utilitarian justifications for copyright are just failing to capture the imagination of 
large sectors (and young sectors) of the population. For many kids alone in university hostel rooms, 
the idea that there might be property rights in the material that they are downloading for free, and 
the idea that doing so causes harm, must seem like a decidedly abstract concept, or just plain 
  
12  Locke Two Treatises on Government, above n 8, at 287–291. 
13  Rose "Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators", above n 7.  
14  This observation is almost ubiquitous in intellectual property theory. For an early exposition of the theme, 
see Paul A Samuelson "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" (1954) 36 The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 387. For a recent iteration, see Herbert Hovencamp "Antitrust and the Movement of Technology" 
(2012) 19 Geo Mason L Rev 1119 at 1120. 
15  Statute of Anne 1710 (GB) 8 Ann c 19. 
16  Constitution of the United States of America, art I.8.8. 
17  Dan Hunter and others (eds) Amateur Media: Social, Cultural and Legal Perspectives (Routledge, London, 
2012). 
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weird.18 Equally weird is the idea that there should be legal sanctions imposed for this kind of thing. 
As an aside, my doctoral supervisor, renowned copyright scholar Professor Jane Ginsburg, is 
currently involved in a project examining papal printing privileges from the 16th century – some of 
which purported to extend throughout Catholic Christendom. Infringers could be punished by 
excommunication.19 Perhaps this puts sanctions in our current law into clearer perspective. 
The internationalisation of copyright seems to make things worse. Domestic copyright law is 
buttressed on all sides by powerful public international law demands. And there is constant pressure 
to up the ante even further. All of this challenges whatever might remain of the social contract that 
undergirds utilitarian justifications for copyright. Within a specific domestic polity, the societal 
bargain – granting of rights in exchange for creative output – might make some intuitive sense.20 
This all gets more than a little abstract, however, when it is other nations' authors, but our legal 
system's rights, and our citizens' dollars. And this all seems especially troubling when the socio-
economic policy calculus that gets reflected in the minutiae of our domestic copyright laws has been 
exported to us, even imposed upon us, from abroad. Different nations' lobbyists, different 
politicians, different policy compromises. With intellectual property, we might be provoked to say, 
with due apologies to Jean-Paul Sartre, that the "public choice hell is other peoples'".  
But the international trade game has a much wider playing field. The underlying exchange is not 
just about intellectual property. It is sometimes characterised as: "give us access for our agricultural 
products and we'll better protect your copyrights".21 There are immediate beneficiaries other than 
Viacom. Some of them live in the Waikato and South Canterbury. But it says something about the 
reputational deficit with which intellectual property is currently burdened that these dots are seldom 
connected in populist commentaries. Whether the exchange is fair is of course a different matter – 
but that's a political and economic problem, not a copyright problem. 
All of this contributes, I think, to a cluster of current anxieties about copyright. As my former 
University of Arizona colleague, prominent United States property scholar Professor Carol Rose, 
points out, almost all property can provoke dispute and anxiety.22 Think of our current engagement 
  
18  Graeme W Austin "The Metamorphosis of Copyright in the Digital Era" (2004) 28 Colum J L & Arts 397. 
19  Jane C Ginsburg "Proto-Property in Literary and Artistic Works: 16th-Century Papal Printing Privileges" 
(paper presented to Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop Series, Columbia, 6 September 2012). 
20  Michael H Davis "Extending Copyright and the Constitution: 'Have I Stayed Too Long?'" (2002) 52 Fla L 
Rev 989 at 1005. But see Graeme W Austin "Does Copyright Mandate Isolationism?" (2002) 26 Colum J L 
& Arts 17 at 44–51 (advancing a number of critiques of bargain theory in copyright). 
21  See Graeme B Dinwoodie "The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System" (2002) 77 
Chi-Kent L Rev 993 at 1004. 
22  Carol M Rose "The Moral Subject of Property" (2007) 48 Wm & Mary L Rev 1897 at 1902. See also Emily 
Sherwin "Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety" (2007) 48 Wm & Mary L 
Rev 1927. 
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with issues surrounding rights to water.23 Reasons for this include the ambiguities and uncertainties 
that cluster around property questions, as well as the ubiquity of our engagement with private 
property. If this is true in the tangible world, it is now very much the case with copyright. As a 
child, I went to the movies, watched television, read books, listened to music on a state-of-the-art 
Phillips radiogram. But this was nothing compared to the incessant use (technically licensing) of 
copyright-protected material that now occurs in our daily lives.   
Recently, I needed to write a conference paper while visiting at another university. I had my 
laptop, but nobody had organised wireless Internet access for me. No JSTOR, no SSRN, no 
HeinOnline, no Westlaw: I didn't know quite what to do with myself. I had to go and find the 
library. Or consider new devices such as the Apple TV that give us seamless access to copyright-
protected material throughout our homes. Or the iPhone that enables me to listen to BBC and PBS 
podcasts during my walk home from the office. Or technologies that enable space shifting of my 
music collection. As an aside, it's perhaps useful to remember the extra value for money we now get 
when we purchase individual copies of copyright-protected works. Once upon a time, that individual 
copy was a vinyl record that sat in a record rack, and could only be played on that radiogram. Many 
of us now wander around with our music collections in our pockets. We're often told that copyrights 
are expanding. But it's perhaps salutary to bear in mind that, with these kinds of space shifting 
technologies, consumers nowadays probably get much more bang for their copyright buck.   
Our incessant engagement with copyright, combined with the perception that some of the 
conventional economic rationales for this kind of property are pallid, if not entirely infirm, might 
account for the intensity in the moral discourse that now surrounds copyright.24 Moral claims are 
made on all sides. Two recent examples: a United Kingdom-based online "television catch up" 
service recently disabled its links to torrent files containing proprietary content. The site had 
adopted a so-called "non-commercial content" stance – it refused access to television programmes 
that were available commercially. Confronted by a cease and desist letter, it sent a message to all its 
subscribers:25    
Whilst we believe that they are wrong both legally and morally on account of the strong 'no commercial 
content' stance that we have always taken, we are not in a position to be able to risk lengthy and costly 
court battles to prove this.  
  
23  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [2013] NZSC 6.  
24  Rose "The Moral Subject of Property", above n 22, at 1902. 
25  The 1709 Blog "C&D letter causes UKNova to take down links to television content" (27 August 2012) 
<http://the1709blog.blogspot.co.nz/2012/08/c-letter-causes-uknova-to-take-down.html>.  
 PROPERTY ON THE LINE: LIFE ON THE FRONTIER BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 7 
Or consider a recent observation by another alumna, Stella Duffy, now working as a London-
based novelist, who was provoked to write this in her blog when she found two of her novels on a 
downloading site:26  
… these pirates who like to see themselves as the Captain Jack Sparrow of the high seas (and seem 
rather more like modern-day pirate-thugs to me) have no problem paying Apple or Microsoft or Dell or 
whoever for the hardware. They have no problem paying the site that is hosting the theft. The ONLY 
person they mind paying is the originator of the work, the writer.  
She ends: "Nice going guys, that's the way to change the world." 
III COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
Copyright is a huge and fascinating topic, and these issues are variously engaged right across 
this body of law. But one area where the debate is truly intense is in the discourse surrounding the 
boundary between copyright and the public domain.  
Those who valorise the public domain sometimes appeal to history, and seem to yearn for some 
kind of golden age: "In the beginning there was the public domain."27 By erecting fences in this 
primordial paradise, copyright represents a kind of fall from grace. Alternatively, it is suggested that 
the familiar narrative explaining the rise of property systems has, in the copyright context, morphed 
into a tragedy of the anti-commons.  Too much private property, too many fences in that primordial 
paradise, too much acquisitiveness about those apples: with the result that the rest of us are locked 
out of those Arcadian fields of freely-available cultural detritus.28 
One answer is said to be turning back the clock. In the United States, for instance, there has been 
no small amount of pining for the "framers' copyright" – that is, the modest copyright envisaged by 
the framing generation. In the beginning, copyrights had an initial term of 14 years; they could be 
forfeited for failure to comply with formalities; the adaptation right did not reach translations and so 
on.29 In the past decade in the United States, these general ideas catalysed a number of 
constitutional challenges to domestic copyright laws.30 To me, this always seemed to make for 
  
26  Stella Duffy "Copyright Theft – Robin Hood it Ain't" (20 March 2012) Not Writing But Blogging 
<http://stelladuffy.wordpress.com/2012/03/20/copyright-theft-robin-hood-it-aint/>. (Emphasis in original.) 
27  Jane C Ginsburg "'Une Chose Publique'? The Author's Domain and the Public Domain in Early British, 
French and US Copyright Law" (2006) 65 CLJ 636 at 637 (critically scrutinising these claims). 
28  Copyright is sometimes likened to a new enclosure movement, whereby ordinary folk are locked out of the 
jus publicum. See James Boyle "The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain" (2003) 66 Law & Contemp Probs 33. 
29  Lawrence Lessig "Copyright's First Amendment" (2001) 48 UCLA L Rev 1057 at 1072. 
30  Most prominently: Golan v Holder 565 US (2012) (forthcoming); Eldred v Ashcroft 537 US 186 (2003). 
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strange bedfellows with constitutional originalists – or, perhaps more accurately, postulant 
bedfellows. For the most part, the originalists aren't signing on to these appeals to history.31  
Others take a more metaphysical turn, seeking to describe the essence of the public domain in 
opposition to copyright. As one leading scholar wrote: "We need to understand the delicate and 
subtle balance between property and the opposite of property, the role of rights, but also of the 
public domain and the commons."32 Grow copyright: shrink the public domain. Copyright 
hypertrophy: public domain atrophy – these are the yin and yang of contemporary copyright politics.  
A Copyright's "Give and Take" 
I worry that conceiving of copyright and the public domain as having a hard-line border between 
them, or as being in opposition to each other, might not project the most useful vision of their 
relationship. As Clifford Geertz admonished us, in all legal activity, it is incumbent upon us to be 
attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible in the "stories [we] tell" and the "visions [we] 
project."33 For one thing, this characterisation risks overlooking copyright's ability to expand the 
public domain. An example of what I mean is provided by the very famous 1930 decision of Judge 
Learned Hand in the United States' Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Nichols v Universal Pictures 
Corporation.34 The plaintiff was the American playwright Ann Nichols, who penned the 
extraordinarily successful play Abie's Irish Rose. Set in early 20th century United States, the play 
concerns an Orthodox Jewish family, the patriarch of which hopes his only son will marry an 
Orthodox Jewish girl; and an Irish Catholic family, the daughter of which has secretly married the 
Jewish boy. When discovered, this situation only serves to intensify the religious animosity between 
the patriarchs of each family, with much Broadway-esque fun along the way. The families are 
reconciled when the young couple produces offspring – that tried and true passport to goodwill. 
Critics panned the play, one commenting that "people laugh at this every night, which explains why 
democracy will never be a success"35 and that the play was "[j]ust about as low as good clean fun 
  
31  On this point, see generally Thomas Nachbar "Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms" (2004) 104 
Colum L Rev 272 at 344–345. 
32  James Boyle The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (Yale University Press, Durham, 
2008) at 238. 
33  Clifford Geertz Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, New York, 
1983) at 175. See also Mary Ann Glendon Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987) at 141–142. 
34  Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation 45 F 2d 119 (2d Cir 1930). 
35  Robert Benchley Life (New York) cited in Dorothy Herrmann With Malice Toward All: The Quips, Lives 
and Loves of Some Celebrated 20th-Century American Wits (G P Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982) at 41.  
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can get."36 Despite or perhaps because of this, the play was a hit. One of the longest-running plays 
on Broadway of its time, it spawned a radio series and two Hollywood movies.  
It also seemed to attract imitators. Ann Nichols brought proceedings against Universal Pictures, 
claiming that United's movie, the Cohens and the Kellys, which, suffice to say, also concerned a 
Jewish and a Catholic family whose relationship is also characterised by perpetual enmity, breached 
her copyright. (In the film it apparently extends to pets: neither family's dog appears to have much 
time for the other). But again the adult children of each house are in love. The Cohens and the 
Kellys was actually a successful series of films, including the follow-ups The Cohens and the Kellys 
in Scotland and The Cohens and the Kellys in Africa. The last in the series, perhaps presaging the 
end of the franchise, was apparently titled The Cohens and the Kellys in Trouble.  
Nichols lost, both in the District Court and on appeal to the Second Circuit. In the Court of 
Appeals, Judge Learned Hand accepted, at least for the sake of argument, that Nichols was the first 
to develop the theme of racially motivated disputants reconciled in the melting pot of America by 
the fecundity of the next generation – and that this same vein also yielded much gold for others, or, 
at least, successful Hollywood movies. Indeed, the District Court found that there was "a fairly 
strong inference that the authors of the film gained some of their ideas from Abie's Irish Rose,"37 – 
but the former took only ideas, and copyright does not protect ideas. So assuming that this general 
idea was original in some sense, copyright granted to Ms Nichols (and took from us)38 copyright in 
her play – Abie's Irish Rose – but, at the same time, copyright took from her (and gave to us) her 
apparently lucrative idea, consigning it to the public domain for others to use.   
Ann Nichols was a commercial playwright. She was not one of those Johnsonian blockheads: 
she wrote for money.39 The case illustrates how copyright's commercial motivations actually grow 
the area beyond copyright – the public domain adds to the raw materials of culture available for free 
for all of us on the non-property side. 
B Thin Copyright for Functional Works 
Copyright doctrines are especially solicitous of the public domain when it comes to functional 
works. The most useful examples involve computer programs. Rightly or wrongly, international law 
  
36  At 41. 
37  Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation 34 F 2d 145 (SD NY 1929) at 150. 
38  Professor Waldron insightfully pursues a Hohfeldian analysis of copyright law, requiring simultaneous 
cognisance of the burdens imposed by copyrights. Jeremy Waldron "From Authors to Copiers: Individual 
Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property" (1993) 68 Chi-Kent L Rev 841 at 844. 
39  Attributed to Samuel Johnson is the observation: "No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money." 
James Boswell (George Birkbeck Hill (ed)) Life of Johnson: Including Boswell's Journal of a Tour to the 
Hebrides and Johnson's Diary of a Journey Into North Wales (Bigelow Brown & Co, New York, 1921) vol 
VI at 307.  
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demands that computer programs be protected by copyright.40 But the international law obligations 
are vague, to say the least, as to the scope of protection required. In many jurisdictions, important 
parts of the intellectual input that goes into producing proprietary software are consigned to the 
public domain.  In New Zealand, as in many other jurisdictions, there are, for instance, specific 
defences for copying computer programs in order to develop certain kinds of interoperable 
products.41 And our law, like that of a number of other nations,42 voids contracts that purport to 
override this provision.43 
In the decisional law and policy discussion, there is also a tendency to "thin" the protection 
afforded by copyright to computer software. Across the Tasman, for instance, both the Full Federal 
Court and the High Court of Australia have restricted the scope of copyright in, for example, lists of 
computer commands.44 And, as early as 1995, the Australian Copyright Law Review Committee on 
Computer Software Protection45 cited with approval a seminal decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit,46 Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc, which 
significantly limited the strength of copyright in cases of non-literal infringement – again, 
consigning to the public domain key aspects of program architecture, especially when these aspects 
are dictated by the function of the program.  
C Copyright Duration 
Of course, when copyrights do eventually expire, more goes into the public domain. If one is 
solicitous of the public domain, therefore, one should also be a copyright enthusiast. But the 
objection is that copyrights last too long. Certainly, the term of "life of the author plus 70 years", the 
term increasingly being adopted, does seem dismayingly long. New Zealand has so far, and 
admirably, held the internationally-mandated line47 of life plus 50 years for many works. It has been 
  
40  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1869 UNTS 299 (signed 15 April 
1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), art 10 (requiring that computer programs be protected as literary 
works under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 828 UNTS 221 
(opened for signature 14 July 1967, entered into force 29 January 1970) [Berne Convention])). The Berne 
Convention dates from 9 September 1886, was revised on 24 July 1971 and amended on 28 September 
1979. 
41  Copyright Act 1994, s 80A. 
42  Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ L111/16.   
43  Copyright Act 1994, s 80D. 
44  Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1997) 37 IPR 436 (FCA).  
45  Copyright Law Review Committee Computer Software Protection (Office of Legal Information and 
Publishing, Attorney-General's Department, 1995) at [9.10]–[9.22]. 
46  Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc 982 F 2d 693 (2d Cir 1992). 
47  Berne Convention, above n 40. 
 PROPERTY ON THE LINE: LIFE ON THE FRONTIER BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 11 
suggested that the intensity of the modern populist outrage at the copyright system seems to date 
from the decision in the United States in the late 1990s to increase copyright terms by 20 years.48 
Greed has consequences.49   
It is useful to recall, though, that even New Zealand's "life of the author plus 50 years" term does 
not tell the whole story. Our law significantly shortens the term of protection for a category of 
works that are applied in industrial contexts.50 These are often functional products. Cutting off the 
copyright term early in this way helps ensure that more "important" kinds of copyright-protected 
works are consigned to the public domain sooner. The length of protection is more or less in line 
with industrial designs and patents. Here, I mean "important" in a very specific sense. Works with 
longer terms, such as songs and movies, are "important", but they are, in a sense, more fungible than 
functional products. Gifted as Lady Gaga might be, there are limits to the extent to which she can 
leverage her copyright monopoly. If copies of her work were priced too high, consumers would 
move on to the next pop diva, and many are doubtless waiting in line. With functional products, 
however, the array of ready substitutes is smaller. Hence the determination that the copyright 
monopoly must end sooner for works of a functional character. Of course, it is questionable whether 
copyright should attach at all. In the United States, for example, copyright consigns many useful 
aspects of products to the public domain from the get-go.51 The viability of the United States 
approach is something we might consider carefully in this country. 
D Unexamined Assumptions  
But back to the main theme. There is, as Professors Madhavi Sunder and Anupam Chander 
have pointed out, a kind of "romance" about the public domain.52 Part of the normative heft 
accompanying the valorisation of the public domain comes from the idea that the externalities of 
copyright protection are more burdensome when technological developments make downstream 
innovation easier. The claim that copyright does not, for instance, inappropriately burden speech 
when it merely privatises expression and not ideas, perhaps looks a little different in the era of the 
mash up. New technologies facilitate creativity using protected expression, not just ideas, and to the 
extent that copyright prohibits this kind of activity, it intolerably burdens creativity.  
  
48  Jane C Ginsburg "How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself" (2002) 26 Colum J L & Arts 61. 
49  Ginsburg, above n 48.  
50  Copyright Act 1994, s 75. 
51  In broad outline, the Copyright Act 17 USC §§ 101–810 consigns to the public domain utilitarian pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works or aspects of these works that cannot be separated, conceptually or physically, 
from the aesthetic aspects of these works. See (3 September 1976) House Report No 94-1476, 94th 
Congress, 2d Session at § 105. This aspect of United States law has distilled a rich, and not entirely 
consistent jurisprudence. See for example Carol Barnhart Inc v Economy Cover Corp 773 F 2d 411 (2d Cir 
1985); Pivot Point International Inc v Charlene Products Inc 372 F 3d 913 (7th Cir 2004). 
52  Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder "The Romance of the Public Domain" (2004) 92 CLR 1331. 
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One difficulty with the argument is that it treats the downstream creative community like a 
"black box" – as if everyone has equal access to technological tools of derivative creativity. But the 
externalities story is a hopeless description of life in many nations. Often, access to electricity 
cannot be taken for granted, let alone fancy digital media tools.53 Quite appropriately, people often 
object that our copyright laws are Eurocentric. But I worry that assumptions about the capacity to 
enjoy and exploit the public domain also betray a first-world bias. I don't decry the importance of 
amateur creativity.54 That said, we should perhaps be more attentive to the class issues that lurk 
below the surface of our celebrations of amateurism. Really good amateur content takes talent, to be 
sure. And, if the blessings of talent are not evenly distributed, the time and the money that are also 
required for amateur creative activity certainly are not. More empirical work is needed on this point 
– but I would hazard a guess that, at least in terms of sheer volume, rather more amateur content is 
produced by the kid in the United States college dorm room, with ready access to bandwidth, 
hardware and software, than by the solo mum holding down two, sometimes, three jobs to put food 
on the table for her family. Surplus time and money for amateur creativity probably sit somewhere 
near the top of the Maslovian hierarchy. Not all of us ever reach those toney heights. To champion 
amateur user-generated content uncritically, without interrogating these class implications, seems 
like an irresponsible basis for the formulation of social policy. And as for that solo mum: we do 
have one famous example that perhaps reminds us that if she does eke out time to write, she might 
appreciate the income that might one day provide her with the kind of economic freedom that some 
dorm-room occupiers at fancy United States universities seem already to take for granted.   
Finally, the recent Wai 262 report55 – the so-called Māori Intellectual Property claim – provides 
a further reminder that the ideas that mark out the boundary between property and the public domain 
can betray cultural biases. Many indigenous peoples are contesting the culturally-specific 
foundations of property rights, including in the intellectual property field.56 Property systems can be 
elaborate and some are highly bureaucratised, but property is also a language, a symbolic 
economy.57 The Wai 262 report reminds us of the importance of trying to understand different 
languages of property, something we've not been very good at in the past. Unthinking adoption of 
  
53  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue A/HRC/17/27 (2011) at [61].  
54  For a more sceptical view, see Andrew Keen The Cult of the Amateur: How Today's Internet is Killing our 
Culture (Nicholas Brealey, London, 2007). 
55  Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy 
Affecting Māori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, 2011). 
56  Laurence R Helfer and Graeme W Austin Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global 
Interface (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011) at 432–502. 
57  Carol M Rose "Introduction: Property and Language, Or, The Ghost of the Fifth Panel" (2006) 18 Yale J L 
& Human 1. 
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other nations' ideas about the scope of copyright is certainly a problem. But, as indigenous peoples' 
claims in the intellectual property space persistently underscore, unthinking importation of foreign 
ideas about the public domain – about the materials of culture that should be unowned – may be 
similarly problematic.  
IV LIVING WELL ON THE FRONTIER 
How we map this frontier says something, I believe, about the kind of society to which we 
aspire. A 2003 United States Supreme Court decision, Dastar Corp v Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation,58 helps to illustrate what I mean. The Dastar case arguably expanded the public 
domain or, at least, shrank the rights of authors. I have long been fascinated by this decision, 
especially for what it says about creative labour.59 It concerned a documentary series produced by 
the plaintiff that was based on the wartime memoirs of President Eisenhower. Due to some 
peculiarities of United States copyright law that need not detain us, copyright in the films fell into 
the public domain. Recognising that popular interest in World War II was increasing, another 
production company reissued the documentaries, but this company failed to acknowledge the 
plaintiff's original authorship of the films. Now, under United States copyright law, this was 
perfectly lawful. Despite its international law obligations, the United States has never enacted a full-
blooded authorial attribution right.60 To partially fill this gap, United States litigators had cleverly 
developed domestic trademark law, so that misinformation about authorship was often considered to 
be a breach of unregistered trademark rights, or, technically, a form of reverse passing off. So this 
case reached the Supreme Court on the issue of whether trademark law could continue to provide an 
attribution right. The Court said no. 
There is a very strong theme in Justice Scalia's opinion that creating a "mutant copyright law" 
out of trademark law would be contrary to a legislative policy that firms should be entitled to market 
public domain works free of any kind of impediments, including attribution rights. Tellingly, the 
Court's analysis rested heavily on a line of cases limiting the scope of trade dress protection in 
consumer products.61 Authors' rights were suspect, therefore, if they got in the way of lower prices. 
Whatever claims authors might have had, they were overridden by the imperative logic of the public 
  
58  Dastar Corp v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 539 US 23 (2003). 
59  "'[H]ow does the creative worker get paid?' can itself be characterized as a human rights issue." Helfer and 
Austin, above n 56, at 195. See also Graeme W Austin and Amy Zavidow "Copyright Law Through a 
Human Rights Lens" in Paul L C Torremans (ed) Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer, The 
Netherlands, 2008) 257. 
60  See Graeme W Austin "The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar" 
(2005) 61 NYU Ann Surv Am L 111, discussing obligations imposed by article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention, above n 39 (entered into force in the United States 1 March 1989). 
61  For example: Bonito Boats Inc v Thunder Craft Boats Inc 489 US 141 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co v Stiffel 
Co 376 US 225 (1964). 
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domain. This is a logic that, in seeing us only as consumers demanding cheaper stuff, obliterates the 
creative worker almost entirely. I believe that very similar logic underlies quite a lot of the 
valorisation of the public domain – which is animated by a desire to get stuff cheaply or even for 
free, so that the efforts of the creative worker do not need to be factored into the bottom line. These 
kinds of ideas also inform some strands of so-called liberal copyright scholarship, especially in the 
United States, which in turn is grounded on a commitment to the idea that tinkering with the ambit 
of property rights (which mostly means reducing their scope), dismantling those fences in that 
public domain paradise, points the way to salvation.  
In my view, the critique must be much more radical. To live well on the frontier between 
copyright and the public domain requires us to examine what we are like, and what we value – 
whether we are merely consumers wanting cheap stuff. It involves asking if protections for the 
creative worker have any moral or political salience, or whether the universe of concerns informing 
our copyright laws should only be informed by a drive to get prices down as close as possible to the 
marginal cost of production. I call this the "Walmartization" of copyright. 
This is partly why in the last few years, I've become so interested in the relationship between 
human rights law and intellectual property.62 Human rights certainly provide compelling reasons for 
being concerned about the public domain, reasons that go beyond getting more stuff more cheaply. 
Human rights law draws attention to a broader set of values: educational rights, environmental 
rights, the right to food, an adequate standard of health, indigenous peoples' rights – with which any 
decent intellectual property system, and any decent society, must contend. And human rights 
lawyers have crafted a powerful lens through which to analyse these issues. These are not just ad 
hoc distributive justice claims du jour. At the same time, however, human rights laws recognise the 
importance and the rights imperatives associated with functioning markets. Hence the recognition in 
many human rights instruments of the right of property.63  
In the intellectual property context, no less venerable document than the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights demands protection of the right of "[e]veryone … to the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she 
is the author."64 The 2005 General Comment65 on the equivalent article in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights66 emphasises the link between this right and the 
  
62  See Helfer and Austin, above n 56. 
63  Helfer and Austin, above n 56, at 212–220. 
64  Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217A (III) (1948) at art 27. 
65  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 17: The Right of Everyone to 
Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or 
Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author E/C12/2005 (2005) at art 15(1)(c).  
66  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 19 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976). 
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idea that authors should enjoy an adequate standard of living, and that they are entitled to just 
remuneration. Amongst other things, the document invites us to take seriously the idea that liberty 
interests can be furthered by participation in functional markets for creative work.   
One of the many themes that Professor Larry Helfer and I develop in our book on human rights 
and intellectual property is that the right to participate in private markets for creative work helps to 
carve out for authors "a zone of personal autonomy in which authors … control their productive 
output, and lead independent, intellectual lives."67 These are things any free society needs, and they 
are nurtured by a system that enables authors to derive at least some of their income from a paying 
public (assuming they can find one) rather than depending entirely on political or other forms of 
patronage.68 In other words, if the public domain were all we had, if property in creative outputs 
were dispatched over the line, we risk creating a new kind of thraldom. 
There is, therefore, a lot at stake in these urgent, sometimes fractious, often dismayingly 
impolite, discussions about the future of copyright. Like all interesting legal issues, they implicate 
questions about the kind of society we want, and who we want to be. And the disputed terrain is 
quite large. Mapping the boundary between copyright and the public domain puts much that is 
important on the line.   
One might conclude by saying: "get over it". Better, I think, is to say: "live with it". Better yet: 
"live well with it".   
Thank you. 
  
  
67  Helfer and Austin, above n 56, at 189 and 194–196. See also Laurence R Helfer "Toward a Human Rights 
Framework for Intellectual Property" (2007) 40 U C Davis L Rev 971 at 996. 
68  Neil W Netanel "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society" (1996) 106 Yale L J 283. 
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